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Bundling and Consumer Misperception
Oren Bar-Gillt
This Essay studies bundling of two (or more) products as a strategic response to consumer
misperception. In contrast to the bundling and tying studied in the antitrust literature-strategies
used by a seller with market power in market A trying to leverage its market power into market
B-bundling in response to consumer misperception may occur in intensely competitive markets.
The analysis demonstrates that such competitive bundling can be either welfare enhancing or welfare
reducing. The Essay considers several "unbundling policies" that can protect consumers and in-
crease welfare in markets where bundling is undesirable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer misperception of the costs and benefits associated with
a product or service is prevalent. It can be the product of imperfect
information or imperfect rationality (or both). It can be independent
of any action taken by sellers. It can be instigated by sellers. And it can
be mitigated by sellers.'
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I A seller offering a superior product has every incentive to ensure that consumers appre-
ciate the superiority of her product. Specifically, such a seller has every incentive to correct any
misperception consumers might have about the shortcoming of a competing product. But cor-
recting consumers' misperceptions is costly. A seller might thus choose to ride the tide of con-
sumer misperception and offer an inferior product, rather than convince consumers that a supe-
rior product justifies a higher price. The concern that sellers will often lack the incentive to edu-
cate consumers is reinforced by the public-good nature of such educational efforts. If a seller
succeeds in correcting consumers' misperceptions, competitors will be quick to adapt their prod-
ucts to the changed demand. And the seller, who brought about this desirable change in demand,
will not be able to recoup her investment in educating consumers. See, for example, Ian Ayres
and Barry Nalebuff, In Praise of Honest Pricing, 45 MIT Sloan Management Rev 24, 28 (Fall
2003) (mentioning the "first-mover disadvantage" that occurs when companies "change the
environment on their own" by supplying information to the marketplace); Howard Beales, Rich-
ard Craswell, and Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J L &
Econ 491, 503-04, 506 (1981) (finding that there is often "an undersupply of general informa-
tion" about products, because when a company furnishes its consumers with information about a
particular product, its competitors benefit too). In a recent contribution Xavier Gabaix and David
Laibson argue that under some conditions sellers will shroud unattractive product attributes even
when advertising costs are zero. See Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes,
Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets (MIT Econ Working
Paper No 05-18. 2005). online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=728545 (visited Jan 6. 2006). In some
cases, signaling, for example, through warranties, can alleviate consumer misperception. See
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This Essay takes consumer misperception as given and studies
one common strategy employed by sellers facing such misperception:
the bundling strategy. "Bundling" in this Essay is used in a somewhat
broader sense than is conventional in the antitrust and industrial or-
ganization literatures. I define the bundling of products A and B to
include any case where a consumer purchasing product A from seller
X has a sufficiently strong incentive to purchase product B from the
same seller. In a second significant departure from the antitrust and
industrial organization literatures, I focus on bundling by sellers oper-
ating in competitive markets.
Consider first consumer misperception about the value of a prod-
uct. To fix ideas assume that a consumer underestimates the amount of
in-home printing she would choose to do if she had a printer at home,
thus underestimating the value to her of owning a printer. Such un-
derestimation of value and of use will also lead the consumer to un-
derestimate the number of ink cartridges she will purchase over the
life of the printer. For instance, the consumer may estimate that she
will need fifty ink cartridges, when in fact she will need one-hundred
cartridges. 3 The argument is that under these assumptions a seller of-
fering only printers will find it hard to compete with a seller who bun-
dles printers and ink, that is, who, through technological compatibility
constraints and/or intellectual property protection, forces consumers
who bought its printers to also purchase its ink cartridges.
The competitive advantage of the bundling seller can be ex-
plained as follows. In a competitive market a seller offering only print-
ers will have to price its printers at the marginal cost of a printer, say
$1000. Consumers who buy printers from this seller will know that
they will have to buy their ink from another seller at the marginal cost
of ink, say $10. Accordingly, the total cost of printing perceived by a
consumer purchasing a printer from the printer-only seller is $1500
(i.e., $1000 + 50 x $10). (The actual, as opposed to perceived, total cost
of printing is $1000 + 100 x $10 = $2000.)
Now consider a bundling seller. This seller may offer the same (or
equivalent) printer at a below-cost price of $500 and cover its losses
by charging $15 per ink cartridge. The total cost of printing perceived
by a consumer purchasing a printer from the bundling seller is $1250
(= $500 + 50 x $15). (The actual, as opposed to perceived, total cost of
Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 Rev Econ
Stud 561, 569 (1977) (finding that product guarantees may act as signals to consumers because
they are "costly to the seller" and are "systematically related to product liability").
2 See, for example, Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 333-35 (MIT 1988).
3 For expositional simplicity this example and most of the analysis in the Essay assumes ine-
lastic demand. A more general model with elastic demand is developed and studied in the Appendix.
The main results are qualitatively unchanged when elastic demand is introduced. See Part II.D.
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printing is $500 + 100 x $15 = $2000, as in the no-bundling case.4)
Given consumer underestimation of ink usage, sellers in a competitive
market must bundle printers and ink.
Overestimation of value and of use can similarly induce a bun-
dling response by sellers. Consider the health club market. Sellers can
charge a per-visit fee. Sellers can also offer a one-year subscription,
which can be viewed as an intertemporal bundle (access to the club in
period 1 is bundled with access in period 2). For consumers who over-
estimate the number of visits they will make to the health club the
bundle/subscription will be the preferred option. Accordingly, in a
competitive market health clubs who fail to offer subscriptions will be
at a disadvantage.
The welfare implications of bundling depend on the type of mis-
perception that triggers the bundling response. Absent bundling, un-
derestimation of value leads to too little trade. In the printers and ink
example this means that too few printers will be purchased. Bundling,
with its accompanying back-loaded pricing, generates an underestima-
tion of cost that offsets the underestimation of value. Bundling re-
stores efficiency. Overestimation of value, on the other hand, leads to
excessive trade. Bundling exacerbates this inefficiency. Absent bun-
dling with per-product marginal cost pricing, the overestimation of
value is partially offset by the overestimation of cost. Bundling, with
its accompanying front-loaded pricing, eliminates this beneficial off-
setting effect.
The bundling strategy has distributional effects as well. When
bundling is a response to underestimation of value and of use, high-
value/use consumers end up cross-subsidizing low-value/use consum-
ers. When bundling is a response to overestimation of value and of
use, low-value/use consumers end up cross-subsidizing high-value/use
consumers. The welfare implications of these distributional effects de-
pend on the identity of the high-value/use and low-value/use groups
Misperception of value is not the only type of misperception that
can trigger a bundling response. Price misperception can similarly force
bundling of the product whose price is misperceived and another prod-
uct whose price is accurately perceived. The efficiency implications are
straightforward. Bundling exacerbates the overconsumption problem
created by underestimation of price. When overestimation of price
leads to underconsumption, bundling alleviates this inefficiency.
4 In a competitive market, the total price collected bv the bundling seller cannot exceed
the total cost, $2000 (= $1000 [cost of a printer] + 100 [actual number of ink cartridges required]
x $10 [cost of an ink cartridge]). Neither can the total price fall below $2000, otherwise the seller
will lose money.
2006]
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The main goal of this Essay is to argue that competitive bundling
in response to persistent consumer misperception is both predicted in
theory and observed in practice. I therefore begin, in Part II, by devel-
oping a theory of bundling in response to consumer misperception. In
Part III, I then proceed to consider briefly three real world examples
of misperception-based bundling. I begin with intertemporal bundling
in subscription markets. I proceed to discuss the credit card market,
which exhibits bundling between transacting and borrowing services
as well as intertemporal bundling. And I end with the cell phone mar-
ket where phones/handsets are bundled with calling plans.
While mainly descriptive, the analysis in this Essay has normative
and prescriptive implications. I show that bundling has both efficiency
and distributional consequences. The feasibility of bundling can either
increase or reduce welfare, depending largely on the type of misper-
ception that triggers the bundling response. When bundling reduces
welfare, regulation that discourages bundling may provide a valuable
tool for policymakers. Part IV considers several unbundling policies!
This Essay studies bundling in competitive markets. It shows that
consumer misperception can lead to welfare-reducing bundling even
in competitive markets. The analysis thus departs from the legal and
economic literatures on bundling and tying that have focused on con-
centrated markets. 6 An important exception is a recent article by David
Evans and Michael Salinger that studies bundling in competitive mar-
kets.' Evans and Salinger, however, highlight the potential cost-based
efficiency of bundling. This Essay explores the potential efficiency and
inefficiency of bundling, when the bundling strategy is adopted in re-
sponse to consumer misperception.
It is important to emphasize at the outset that the proposed ac-
count of bundling, and of the pricing of the bundle and its compo-
nents, as a response to consumer misperception is not offered as an
exhaustive or even a dominant account. There are other important
explanations for the bundling strategy that have nothing to do with
5 The analysis has a second policy implication. The existence of product bundles and the
pricing of these bundles can be used as indicators of persistent consumer misperception in the
examined market. However, bundles with similar pricing patterns may also be the product of
other economic forces. Therefore, observing such bundles and pricing patterns should not be
considered decisive evidence of misperception.
6 See, for example, Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as a Barrier to Entry, 119 Q J Econ 159, 183
(2004); Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and
Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J Econ 194, 198 (2002); Michael D. Whin-
ston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 Am Econ Rev 837,838 (1990).
7 David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from
Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 Yale J Reg 37, 42 (2005). See also Rich-
ard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62
BU L Rev 661,681-87 (1982) (discussing cases in which bundling is likely to be efficient).
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consumer misperception. In particular, as noted above, many bundles
can be justified on cost-saving grounds. Moreover, many observed
bundles can be explained by a combination of the misperception-
based and cost-based accounts.
Market responses to consumers' imperfect rationality are the sub-
ject of increasing attention in the behavioral economics literature.8 An
important recent contribution by Stefano Della Vigna and Ulrike
Malmendier develops a model of optimal two-part tariff pricing with
consumer misperception.9 My analysis of how bundled components
should optimally be priced builds on the Della Vigna and Malmendier
model. Della Vigna and Malmendier also discuss many of the markets
that feature in this Essay. Della Vigna and Malmendier, however, take
the existence of the bundle as given.' The main contribution of this
Essay is to endogenize bundling-to present bundling as an important
strategic response to consumer misperception. I also discuss welfare
and policy implications that are not identified in previous work."
Finally, the potential role of bundling as a strategic response to
consumers' imperfect rationality has been recognized in two impor-
tant early articles by Richard Thaler and Richard Craswell. Pioneering
the field of behavioral economics, Thaler's seminal contribution shows
how mental accounting (by consumers), and specifically the framing
and coding of multiple gains and losses, can lead sellers to adopt a bun-
dling strategy.2 Craswell, working at the intersection of antitrust law
and consumer protection law, identifies the viability of misperception-
8 See, for example, Gabaix and Laibson, Shared Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Infor-
mation Suppression in Competitive Markets (cited in note 1) (discussing sellers' frequent practice
of shrouding information about their products when that information is not readily available to
the public); Stefano Della Vigna and Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym 2 (unpub-
lished manuscript 2005), online at http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/malmendier/personalpage/
Papers/gymemp05-04-20.pdf (visited Jan 6, 2006) (studying consumer behavior regarding gym
membership); Sharon M. Oster and Fiona M. Scott Morton, Behavioral Decision-Making: An
Application to the Setting of Magazine Subscription Prices 5 (SSRN Working Paper Series, 2004),
online at http://ssrn.comlabstract=467 2 2 2 (visited Jan 6, 2006).
9 See Stefano Della Vigna and Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory
and Evidence, 119 Q J Econ 353,357 (2004).
10 An important exception is Della Vigna and Malmendier's analysis of endogenous switch-
ing costs. Id at 385. Previous analyses of subscription contracts may also be interpreted as study-
ing endogenous intertemporal bundling. See id at 392 (collecting examples of intertemporal
bundling from other industries); Della Vigna and Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym at 1
(cited in note 8) (modeling a choice between monthly and annual health club subscriptions);
Oster and Morton, Behavioral Decision-Making at 1 (cited in note 8) (magazine subscriptions).
Intertemporal bundling is discussed in Part III.
11 Specifically, Della Vigna and Malmendier ask how misperception affects welfare, while I
ask how bundling affects welfare (taking misperception as given).
12 See Richard Thaler, MentalAccounting and Consumer Choice, 4 Marketing Sci 199, 208-
09 (1985).
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driven bundling in competitive markets.13 I generalize Thaler's and
Craswell's insights and explore their welfare and policy implications.
II. BUNDLING IN RESPONSE TO CONSUMER MISPERCEPTION
A. Printers and Ink
When consumers misperceive the costs or benefits of one prod-
uct, competition may force sellers to bundle this product with another
product. I allow for separate pricing of the two products, but show that
the competitive response to consumer misperception will often entail
a single price. It is important to note that an effective bundle can exist
even when two (or more) distinct products are separately priced. This
bundle can be sustained through technology (i.e., compatibility con-
straints), law (i.e., contractual obligation), or simply economic or psy-
chological switching/transaction costs.
Consider a competitive market for printers. Assume, however,
that once a consumer buys a brand X printer she can buy ink car-
tridges only from X (as a matter of technological compatibility). How
will sellers price their product? Or, more accurately, how will they
price their two bundled products: printers and cartridges? 4
Take a specific example. Let the cost of a printer be 1000 and the
cost of an ink cartridge be 10. Assume that the seller knows that an
average consumer will buy 100 cartridges over the life of the printer.(Inelastic demand is assumed for expositional simplicity. An elastic
demand extension is developed in the Appendix; the results are sum-
marized in Part II.D.) The total per-consumer cost is thus 2000. If con-
sumers are homogeneous in their printing practices," and fully aware
of their expected use of the printer, then a continuum of printer-ink
price pairs is possible. To see this, let pp and p, denote the price of a
printer and of an ink cartridge, respectively. The consumer thus ex-
pects to pay a total price of P = pp + 100 • p,. Competition guarantees
that the total price P equals the total cost to the seller, namely,
P = p + 100. p, = 2000. This competitive pricing condition is satisfied by
per-product marginal cost pricing: pp = 1000 and p, = 10. But it is also
satisfied, for example, by pp = 0 and p, = 20 and by pp = 2000 and p, = 0.
Consumer heterogeneity breaks the indifference between the in-
finity of possible price combinations. Consider two types of consum-
13 See Craswell, 62 BU L Rev at 671-81 (cited in note 7).
14 The analysis below directly applies to any market where a durable product is bundled
with replacement parts or service. And, as explained below, it also applies more broadly to any
misperception-based bundling of two goods, services, or components.
15 The homogeneous consumer case can be viewed as homogeneity within a class of con-
sumers that has been segmented by sellers.
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ers: high-use consumers who will buy 110 cartridges on average and
low-use consumers who will buy 90 cartridges on average. Assume an
equal number of high- and low-use consumers. The pp = 0, p, = 20 price
pair is unattractive to high-use consumers. These consumers expect to
pay 2200 under this pricing scheme, and will thus be quick to choose a
seller offering a more balanced price combination. Specifically, high-
use consumers will prefer per-product marginal cost pricing, under
which they expect to pay 2100. Conversely, the pp = 2000 and p, = 0
price pair is unattractive to low-use consumers. These consumers ex-
pect to pay 2000 under this pricing scheme, and will thus prefer per-
product marginal cost pricing, under which they expect to pay 1900.
Heterogeneity will thus lead sellers to price both their printers and
their ink cartridges at marginal cost.'6 Perhaps more importantly, elas-
tic demand also breaks the indifference between the possible price
combinations and leads to marginal cost pricing (see Appendix).
B. Underestimation of Value/Use
Now assume that consumers are myopic and systematically un-
derestimate the amount of printing they will do and thus the number
of ink cartridges that they will buy. How does consumer misperception
affect the above result that competition will lead to per-product mar-
ginal cost pricing?
For expositional clarity, I return to the unrealistic benchmark
market where consumers are homogeneous with respect to their print-
ing practices. Absent consumer misperception any price combination
satisfying pp + 100- p, = 2000 can persist in a competitive market. What
if consumers mistakenly believe that they will need 50 ink cartridges,
rather than 100 cartridges-the true number of cartridges that they
will use? Compare the perceived attractiveness of the three price pairs
considered above. With the pp = 2000, p, = 0 pricing scheme, the con-
sumer will perceive a total price of 2000. With the p, = 1000, p, = 10
pricing scheme, the consumer will perceive a total price of 1500. And
with the pp = 0, p, = 20 pricing scheme, the consumer will perceive a
total price of 1000. Because sellers get the same total price under the
three pricing schemes, they will choose the pp = O,pi = 20 scheme.'7
This result is robust to the introduction of consumer heterogene-
ity. As before, assume that there are two types of consumers: high-use
16 Other equilibria where high-use consumers are offered one contract/pricing scheme and
low-use consumers are offered another contract/pricing scheme are theoretically possible (if
sellers can make low-price ink compatible only with high-price printers). In a competitive mar-
ket, however, sellers have no incentive to deviate from per-product marginal cost pricing.
17 In theory sellers might even set a negative printer price, pp , and raise the ink price, pi,
above 20. In practice, however, negative prices pose too big a temptation for strategic behavior.
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consumers who will buy 110 cartridges on average, and low-use con-
sumers who will buy 90 cartridges on average. Introducing consumer
misperception, assume that the high-use consumers think they will
buy 60, rather than 110, ink cartridges, and that the low-use consumers
think they will buy 40, rather than 90, ink cartridges.
Compare the perceived attractiveness of the three price pairs
considered above. With the pp = 2000, p, = 0 pricing scheme both high-
use and low-use consumers will perceive a total price of 2000. With the
pp = 1000, p, = 10 pricing scheme, high-use consumers will perceive a
total price of 1600 and low-use consumers will perceive a total price of
1400. And with the p, = 0, p, = 20 pricing scheme, high-use consumers
will perceive a total price of 1200, and low-use consumers will per-
ceive a total price of 800. Because sellers get the same total price under
the three pricing schemes, they will choose the pp =0, p, = 20 scheme. 8
The preceding analysis focused on the pricing of printers and ink,
taking the existence of the printer-ink bundle as given. But the forma-
tion of bundles in itself is an endogenous deliberate strategy. A main
theme of this Essay is that the bundling strategy is an effective, often
inevitable, response to consumer misperception. The optimal pricing
analysis demonstrated the dominance of the pp = 0, p, = 20 scheme.
This pricing scheme cannot survive without effective bundling of print-
ers and ink. Absent such bundling, a consumer who received a free
printer under the pp = 0, p, = 20 scheme will buy ink at the marginal
cost of p, = 10 from an independent ink seller. Foreseeing this dynamic
no one will adopt the free printer-expensive ink tactic.
Making the pp = 0, p, = 20 scheme viable, however, is an attractive
prospect. As shown above, this scheme, if viable, dominates all other
pricing schemes. Specifically, it dominates the pricing scheme that in-
evitably emerges absent bundling, the pp = 1000, p, = 10, marginal-cost
pricing scheme. Sellers thus have a powerful incentive to bundle print-
ers and ink. Indeed, sellers employ technological compatibility con-
straints coupled with intellectual property protection to secure effec-
tive bundling of printers and ink.9
18 The analysis in the text considers only heterogeneity with respect to printer use. Another
important dimension of heterogeneity, whose implications are not explored here, is heterogene-
ity with respect to the level of the bias/misperception (including, for example, the case where
some consumers underestimate use and some overestimate use). For an analysis of this type of
heterogeneity in related contexts, see generally Della Vigna and Malmendier, Paying Not to Go
to the Gym (cited in note 8). See also Della Vigna and Malmendier, 119 Q J Econ at 360 (cited in
note 9) (setting a variable that represents a given consumer's estimate of his consumption of a
product at a given time); John Haltiwanger and Michael Waldman, Rational Expectations and the
Limits of Rationality:An Analysis of Heterogeneity, 75 Am Econ Rev 326,328-33 (1985).
19 Hall reports that printer manufacturers control more than 90 percent of the ink market.
Robert E. Hall, The Inkjet Aftermarket:An Economic Analysis 23 (unpublished manuscript 1997)
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What are the welfare implications of the bundling of printers and
ink cartridges and, specifically, of the pp = 0, p, = 20 pricing scheme
that such bundling entails? It may seem, at first blush, that there are
no welfare implications. After all, under all three pricing schemes-
pp = 2000,p, = O;pp = 1000,p, = 10; andpp = O,p. = 20-the average con-
sumer ends up paying the exact same amount: 2000. But the three
pricing schemes are not welfare neutral.
First, while the average consumer will end up paying the same
amount under the different schemes, some consumers will benefit and
some consumers will lose. Table 1 lists the total (and per-use/cartridge)
payments of high-use and low-use consumers under each of the three
pricing schemes
TABLE 1
The Differential Effect of Pricing Distortions
on the Two Consumer Types
High-use consumers Low-use consumers
pay pay
Total: 2000 Total: 2000
pp = 2000, p, = 0 (Per use/cartridge: 18.2) (Per use/cartridge: 22.2)
Perceived total: 2000 Perceived total: 2000
Total: 2100 Total: 1900
pp = 1000,p, = 10 (Per use/cartridge: 19.1) (Per use/cartridge: 21.1)
Perceived total: 1600 Perceived total: 1400
Total: 2200 Total: 1800
pp = O,p, = 20 (Per use/cartridge: 20) (Per use/cartridge: 20)
Perceived total: 1200 Perceived total: 800
Table 1 shows that low-use consumers benefit from a move to the
p = 0, p, = 20 pricing scheme, while high-use consumers lose from such
a move. This distributional effect can be seen as either good or bad,
depending on the identity of the high-use and low-use consumers, but
it is not welfare neutral."
A second welfare implication derives from the distortion in the
number of printers that consumers buy. Underestimation of value/use
(on file with author). Also consistent with the above analysis, Hall suggests that ink cartridges
are "hugely profitable." Id at 4.
20 In fact, even if the two buyer types are identical in every aspect other than their printing
practices, still the distributional effect of the different pricing schemes will not be welfare neu-
tral. With decreasing marginal utility of money, a loss to one individual is not perfectly balanced
by a commensurate gain to another individual. Consider two identical individuals (with the same
level of wealth), A and B. When a sum X is transferred from A to B, the reduction in A's utility is
greater than the increase in B's utility. For a definition and discussion of the decreasing marginal
utility assumption, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 10-11 (Aspen 6th ed 2003).
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naturally leads to the purchase of too few printers, at least absent
bundling. To see this let v denote the per-cartridge value of printing to
the average consumer. The total value of printing to the average con-
sumer is thus 100v. Because the total cost of printing is 2000 (recall that
the cost of a printer is 1000 and the cost of an ink cartridge is 10), it is
efficient for a consumer to purchase a printer whenever 100v > 2000
or v > 20. With underestimation of value/use the perceived total value
of printing is 50v (< 100v). Under the pp = 1000, p, = 10, marginal-cost-
pricing scheme the average consumer perceives a total price of printing
of 1500, and will thus purchase a printer whenever 50v > 1500 or v > 30.
In particular, efficient purchases will not occur whenever 20 < v < 30.
Bundling cures this problem. With bundling coupled with the
pp = 0, p, = 20 pricing scheme, the average consumer perceives a total
price of printing of 1000, and will thus purchase a printer whenever
50v > 1000 or v > 20. Efficiency is restored. The underestimation of
value is perfectly offset by the underestimation of total price. Bun-
dling in response to underestimation is welfare enhancing.
C. Overestimation of Value/Use
What would be the market response to the opposite kind of mis-
perception-to overestimation, rather than underestimation, of use?
Although overestimation is less likely in the printer-ink context, I con-
tinue with this example for ease of exposition.
Again, I return to the unrealistic benchmark market where con-
sumers are homogeneous with respect to their printing practices. As-
sume that consumers mistakenly believe that they will need 150 ink
cartridges, rather than 100 cartridges-the true number of cartridges
that they will use. Compare the perceived attractiveness of the three
price pairs considered above. With the p, = 2000, p, ' 0 pricing scheme,
the consumer will perceive a total price of 2000. With the pp = 1000,
p, = 10 pricing scheme the consumer will perceive a total price of 2500.
And with the pp = 0, p, = 20 pricing scheme the consumer will perceive
a total price of 3000. Because sellers get the same total price under the
three pricing schemes, they will choose thepp = 20 00 ,p, = 0 scheme."1
The optimal pricing scheme with overestimation of use-
pp=2000, p,=0-is diametrically opposite to the optimal pricing
scheme with underestimation of use-pp = 0, p, = 20. The bundling of
printers and ink, however, is equally necessary to support this very
different pricing scheme. Absent such bundling, the consumer would
purchase a printer at the marginal cost of p, = 1000 from an independ-
21 As in the preceding Part, this result is robust to the introduction of consumer heterogeneity.
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ent printer seller and then pick up free ink from the seller offering the
pp = 2000, pi = 0 scheme. Anticipating this dynamic, no one will adopt
the expensive printer/free ink tactic. As with underestimation of use,
here too sellers have a strong incentive to make the pp = 2000, p, = 0
scheme viable, by bundling printers and ink. Arguably, effective bun-
dling with pp = 2000, p, = 0 pricing can be more easily achieved, as
compared to effective bundling with p, = 0, p, = 20 pricing (as was
needed with consumer underestimation of use). All sellers need to do
is to price discriminate in the sale of ink between consumers who pur-
chased their printer from the same seller and consumers who pur-
chased their printer from a different seller. (Of course, ink arbitrage
must also be prevented: a person who purchased a printer from an
expensive printer/cheap ink seller must not be allowed to buy a mil-
lion ink cartridges at the low price and then resell most of these car-
tridges to consumers who purchased their printer from another seller.)
What are the welfare implications of the bundling of printers and
ink cartridges, this time with the pp = 2000, p, = 0 pricing scheme? As
before, while the average consumer will end up paying the same
amount under the different schemes, some consumers will benefit and
some consumers will lose. The distributional implications, however, are
the reverse of those resulting from the pp = 0, p, = 20 scheme adopted
in response to underestimation ,of value/use. High-value/use consum-
ers benefit from a move to the p, = 2000, p, = 0 pricing scheme, while
low-value/use consumers lose from such a move.
Now to efficiency: while bundling increased efficiency when
adopted in response to underestimation of value/use, the opposite is
true when bundling responds to overestimation of value/use. To see
this, let v denote the per-cartridge value of printing to the average
consumer. The total value of printing to the average consumer is thus
100v. Because the total cost of printing is 2000 (recall that the cost of a
printer is 1000 and the cost of an ink cartridge is 10), it is efficient for a
consumer to purchase a printer whenever 100v > 2000 or v > 20.
With overestimation of value/use, the perceived total value of
printing is 150v (> 100v). Overestimation of value/use naturally leads
to the purchase of too many printers even under marginal cost pricing.
Under the pp = 1000, p, = 10, marginal-cost-pricing scheme, the average
consumer perceives a total price of printing of 2500, and will thus pur-
chase a printer whenever 150v > 2500 or v > 16.6. In particular, ineffi-
cient purchases will occur whenever 16.6 < v < 20. While overestima-
tion produces inefficiency even absent bundling, bundling exacerbates
this inefficiency. With bundling coupled with the pp = 2000, p, = 0 pric-
ing scheme, the consumer will purchase a printer whenever
150v > 2000 or v > 13.3. Namely, the range of inefficient purchases
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increases from 16.6 < v < 20 without bundling to 13.3 < v < 20 with
bundling.
Without bundling, marginal-cost pricing leads to overestimation
of the total price in addition to the overestimation of value. And two
overestimations are better than one: the overestimation of the total
price partially offsets the overestimation of value, thus reducing the
inefficiency.2 With bundling, sellers frontload the entire cost of printing
onto the price of the printer, preventing overestimation of total price by
the consumer. By removing the beneficial offsetting effect of price
overestimation, bundling exacerbates the excessive trade problem.
D. Elastic Demand
The preceding analysis assumed that the demand for ink is inelas-
tic, namely that the number of ink cartridges that the consumer will
purchase, as well as the number of ink cartridges that the consumer
perceives that she will purchase, does not depend on the price of ink.
This assumption, although useful for demonstrating the main implica-
tions of misperception-based bundling, is clearly unrealistic. In this
section I describe the results of a more general elastic demand model,
which is developed and analyzed in the Appendix. These results con-
firm that the main features of misperception-based bundling, as de-
veloped in Parts II.B and II.C above, are robust to the introduction of
elastic demand.
In the inelastic demand model, the bundling seller chose extreme
pricing schemes: pp = 0, p, =20 in the underestimation case and
p, = 2000, p, = 0 in the overestimation case. Elastic demand introduces
a new factor that might lead to less extreme pricing schemes. With
elastic demand, increasing (decreasing) the price of ink above (below)
marginal cost leads to distortions in the amount of ink that is actually
purchased (affecting also the amount of ink that the consumer thinks
she will purchase). In equilibrium this inefficiency will be balanced
against the forces that push the price of ink away from marginal cost.
Nevertheless, the main results developed in the preceding sections
continue to hold: when consumers underestimate value/use, ink will be
priced above marginal cost and printers will be priced below marginal
cost; and when consumers overestimate value/use, ink will be priced
below marginal cost and printers will be priced above marginal cost.
The elastic demand model also qualifies the welfare implications
derived in the inelastic demand model. In the inelastic demand model,
22 The overestimation of total price completely offsets the overestimation of value under
the pp = 0, p, = 20 scheme. Under this pricing scheme, the consumer will purchase a printer when-
ever 150v > 3000 or v > 20.
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bundling in response to underestimation of value is unambiguously
beneficial, because it improves the printer purchasing decision. In the
elastic demand model, this improvement in the printer purchasing
decision must be weighed against the distortion in the ink purchasing
decision caused by the deviation from marginal cost pricing. The nor-
mative appeal of bundling is, therefore, reduced.
When consumers overestimate the value/use of printing, bundling
was shown to be welfare-reducing in the inelastic demand model. This
result is strengthened in the elastic demand model where distortions
in the ink purchasing decision caused by the deviation from marginal
cost pricing constitute an additional cost of bundling.
E. Bundling in Response to Price Misperception
Bundling is a strategic response to consumer misperception. This
idea has been demonstrated above, focusing on consumer mispercep-
tion about the value of the product. Another type of misperception
that can induce a bundling response is price misperception.
Pure price misperception is arguably rare. Price is usually the
most salient feature of a product--the one thing consumers can be
expected to perceive with reasonable accuracy. Still, consumers mis-
perceive prices, especially when these prices are not immediately due.
Returning to the printers and ink example, Robert Hall found that
"people buy inkjet printers without information about [the cost of
replacement ink]." 3 Credit purchases provide another example. Many
consumers systematically underestimate the total price they will end
up paying simply because they do not understand how fast interest
accrues.
Consider two products (or two components) A and B that can be
separately manufactured and sold at unit costs of cA and cB, respec-
tively. The value to consumers of product A is vA, and the value to con-
sumers of product B is v. Consumers are assumed to be homogene-
ous. Absent bundling in a competitive market, product A would be
sold at a price of PA = CA, and product B would be sold at a price of
PB = C." Under reasonable assumptions this would be the market out-
come regardless of consumer perception or misperception.
Now allow for bundling. Without loss of generality, assume that
consumers misperceive the price of product B to be PB = C " PB. I be-
gin with underestimation of PB, or 6 < 1. Absent bundling, the equilib-
rium will exhibit (per-product) marginal cost pricing, i.e.,
(PA'PB) = (CAc'). This equilibrium cannot be sustained when bundling
23 Hall, Inkjet Aftermarket at 22-23 (cited in note 19). This lack of information about price
is independent of any misperception about use.
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is feasible. Sellers offering such (per-product) marginal cost pricing
would lose business to a competitor that sells the two products as a
bundle A-B and sets PA < cA and PB < cR. In fact, at equilibrium
(PAPB) = (O,ca + C).
To see why, note that the perceived cost of the bundle is
P = PA + PB = PA + (" P.B" Competition will force equilibrium prices
(PAPB) that minimize P subject to the constraint PA + PB >- CA + CB (I
assume nonnegative prices, PAPB > 0). The (PAPB) = (0, CA +CB)
result follows. The intuition underlying this result is straightforward.
Every dollar subtracted from the price of product A is perceived by
consumers as a $1 benefit; every dollar added to the price of product
B is perceived by consumers as a $,5(< $1) cost. Sellers will thus trans-
fer as much of the price as possible from product A to product B.
It bears emphasis that a seller who fails to adopt the bundling
strategy will be driven out of the market. A seller who offers product
A alone will have to charge PA > CA. Similarly, a seller who offers
product B alone will have to charge PB > CB- The bundled product
would always appear more attractive to consumers.
Now assume that consumers overestimate the price of product B,
or 6 > 1. Again, when bundling is feasible (per-product) marginal-cost
pricing cannot be sustained in equilibrium. As before the perceived
cost of the bundle is/3 = PA + PB = PA + 4" PB. And again competition
will force equilibrium prices (PAPB) that minimize P subject to the
constraint PA + PB > CA + CB. But now, with 6 > 1, this minimization
implies (PA ,PB) = (CA + CB,0) . A parallel intuition explains this result.
Every dollar subtracted from the price of product B is perceived by
consumers as a $6(> $1) benefit; every dollar added to the price of
product A is perceived by consumers as a $1 cost. Sellers will thus
transfer as much of the price as possible from product B to product A.
The efficiency implications are straightforward. Bundling exacer-
bates the overconsumption problem created by underestimation of price.
Overestimation of price leads to underconsumption absent bundling. This
inefficiency is completely alleviated when bundling is feasible.
III. THREE EXAMPLES
A. Subscription Services
One special type of bundling that directly responds to consumer
misperception is the intertemporal bundling achieved through multi-
period subscriptions. In intertemporal bundling, the only difference
between the bundled components is the timing. For example, a year-
long subscription-to a magazine, a wireless or landline phone service,
an ISP, or a health club-provides the same service every month
throughout the year. Why are multiperiod subscriptions so common?
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Why not sell only single-period products or services? Consumer mis-
perception provides an answer."
Consider a health club offering access to its facilities on a per-
visit basis. In a competitive market this health club will have to set its
admission fee equal to marginal cost, say $10 per visit. Assume that
the average consumer overestimates her future use of the health club:
instead of ten visits per year the consumer anticipates that she will
make twenty visits per year." Under per-period marginal cost pricing
the consumer expects a total cost of $200. Now assume that a competi-
tor offers-instead of or in addition to the per-visit fee-a yearlong
subscription for a price of $100. (I assume that health clubs know the
number of visits made by an average consumer.) The consumer will
clearly prefer the multi-period subscription over per-period admission.
Many subscription services charge a one-time subscription fee as
described in the preceding health club example. Other subscription
services charge a per-period fee, but follow a fee schedule very differ-
ent from per-period marginal cost pricing. In particular, many sub-
scription services charge different per-period prices for different peri-
ods within a multiperiod subscription. Especially common is the prac-
tice of offering a low price, or even a zero price, for an introductory
period.: One explanation for this practice is that sellers are exploiting
consumer misperception - this time, consumer underestimation of
future use. When signing on to a yearlong subscription service with a
"two-month free" introductory offer, some consumers think that they
will end the subscription after the first two months. Not all of these
consumers actually end their subscription after two months. Put dif-
ferently, sellers may be responding to consumers' underestimation of
the length of the period during which they would need or want a sub-
scription with the specific seller. If consumers underestimate the effec-
tive subscription period, then sellers in a competitive market will
backload their price as much as possible.
24 For important theoretical and empirical analyses of subscription markets and contracts
from a behavioral perspective, see Della Vigna and Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym
(cited in note 8) (studying health club membership contracts); Della Vigna and Malmendier, 119
Q J Econ 353 (cited in note 9) (setting forth a theoretical analysis supported by evidence from
numerous markets); Oster and Morton, Behavioral Decision-Making (cited in note 8) (analyzing
magazine subscriptions).
25 This is an assumption supported by casual observation as well as by more rigorous em-
pirical analysis. See Della Vigna and Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym at 11-12 (cited in
note 8) (finding that "[t]he average forecasted number of monthly visits ... is more than twice as
large as average attendance").
26 Examples include introductory offers by newspapers and magazines, credit card teaser
rates, etc.
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This too is an example of intertemporal bundling. The cement
holding the bundle together is the cost of switching from one seller to
another or simply the cost of terminating the subscription. It is con-
sumers' underestimation of these switching costs that explains the
viability of a below-marginal cost introductory fee. Because switching
costs keep the bundle together, it is not surprising that sellers do not
make a special effort to reduce these costs. Perhaps the notorious ten
minute "please hold for the next available representative" wait that
must be endured to cancel a subscription is not merely the result of a
seller's attempt to economize on the size of its customer service de-
partment. More direct measures designed to increase switching costs
are lock-in clauses and termination fees. If consumers underestimate
the cost of switching or, equivalently, underestimate the likely length
of their subscription, sellers who fail to take advantage of switching
cost-induced bundling and offer only per-period marginal cost pricing
will not survive in a competitive market.27
The normative implications of intertemporal bundling depend on
the misperception to which the bundling responds. Consider overesti-
mation of future health club use due to overestimation of self control.
Absent bundling, such overestimation of value would lead to excessive
initial visits to the health club by consumers who will not make suffi-
cient return visits to secure any benefit. Bundling with a front-loaded
subscription price will only exacerbate this inefficiency.
Next consider bundling in response to underestimation of use due
to overestimation of termination/switching or underestimation of ter-
mination/switching costs. Absent bundling, that is, with zero termina-
tion/switching costs, the consumer would make efficient period-by-
period decisions. Bundling will lead to excessive initiation of subscrip-
tion contracts.
B. Credit Cards
The credit card is a complex, multi-attribute product.s In fact, the
credit card is a bundle of different products and services. The credit
27 For a formal analysis of the underestimation of switching costs and its implications, see
Della Vigna and Malmendier, 119 Q J Econ at 389 (cited in note 9).
28 This Part is based on Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw U L Rev 1373 (2004).
Economist Lawrence Ausubel was the first to suggest that credit card pricing responds to con-
sumer misperception. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card
Market, 81 Am Econ Rev 50, 70-72 (1991). See also Haiyan Shui and Lawrence Ausubel, Time
Inconsistency in the Credit Card Market 2-3 (14th Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference, May
2004), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=586622 (visited Jan 6, 2006); David Laibson, Andrea
Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman, A Debt Puzzle, in Philippe Aghion, et al, ed, Knowledge, Infor-
mation, and Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics: In Honor of Edmund S. Phelps 228,230-
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card bundles together transacting and borrowing services. The credit
card also implements intertemporal bundling, where borrowing now is
bundled with borrowing later. The argument advanced in this Essay
suggests that these forms of bundling are a strategic response to con-
21
sumer misperception.
Evidence suggests that consumers systematically underestimate
their future credit card borrowing. They also underestimate the likeli-
hood that they will need to consume various borrowing-related ser-
vices. They underestimate the likelihood of late repayment. They un-
derestimate the likelihood of requiring a special (and more expensive)
loan beyond their specified credit limit.O Beyond underestimation of
borrowing (and consequently of the likelihood that they will use bor-
rowing-related services), consumers also underestimate the price of
borrowing and borrowing-related services. They underestimate the speed
with which interest accrues. They do not fully understand the implica-
tions of minimum payments and low (or even negative) amortization
rates. And they are not aware of various computational techniques
employed by issuers to increase the magnitude of interest (and re-
lated) payments.3'
What are the implications of consumers' underestimation of the
amount of borrowing and of the price of borrowing? In particular,
what are the implications for the transacting service? Can the trans-
acting service be offered independently? Imagine a card issuer who
offers only transacting services-a debit card. In a competitive market
this issuer would have to set a price equal to the marginal cost of the
transacting service offered. Now consider a credit card issuer that
bundles transacting and financing services. Given consumer underes-
timation of borrowing, the credit card issuer would respond by setting
a high price for the financing service and a low price for the transact-
ing service. In fact, credit card issuers often offer a negative price for
the transacting service: the transacting consumer receives bonus points
and frequent flyer miles for, every dollar spent. With underestimation of
borrowing, the bundle offered by the credit card issuer will be more
31 (Princeton 2003); Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bank-
ruptcy, 71 Am Bankr L J 249,261 (1997).
29 I do not wish to preclude other explanations, for example cost-based explanations, for
the bundling of transacting and borrowing services in the credit card.
30 Consumers also underestimate their use of different transacting-related services, for
example, currency exchange pursuant to foreign purchases.
31 For a description of these techniques, see Mark Furletti. Credit Card Pricing Develop-
ments and Their Disclosure, Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper 1, 14-16 (Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia 2003), online at http://www.phil.frb.org/pcc/discussion/discussion0l03.pdf
(visited Jan 6, 2006) (discussing such techniques as payment allocation, compounded interest,
and double-cycle interest, which help increase the size of interest payments).
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attractive to consumers than transacting and borrowing services sold
separately (and at per-service marginal cost).
Consistent with this analysis, debit cards, despite their increasing
popularity, are finding it difficult to compete with the credit card bun-
dle. Absent the back-end financing and revenues from fees that credit
card issuers enjoy, debit card issuers cannot match the attractive short-
term perks that credit card issuers routinely offer.32 Accordingly, debit
cards are quickly replacing checks, but are not as successful in sup-
planting credit cards.""
Moving on to intertemporal bundling, consumers underestimate
the cost of switching cards and thus overestimate the likelihood of
switching. Issuers respond by offering short-term credit at low, even
zero-interest teaser rates. Lenders offering equivalent short-term
credit as a stand alone service must price the loan at cost, and thus
cannot compete with an issuer that engages in intertemporal bundling.
What are the welfare consequences of the different forms of bun-
dling observed in the credit card market? Absent bundling, consumers
would make accurate transacting and short-term borrowing decisions.
Bundling, with its accompanying back-loaded prices, leads to excessive
transacting and short-term borrowing.
The distributional consequences of credit card bundling are also
troubling. Bundling of transacting and financing with prices back-
loaded onto the long-term financing component implies that borrow-
ers-consumers who are more likely to use and pay for the financing
services-will cross-subsidize transactors -consumers who use their
cards mainly for transacting and enjoy free service plus frequent flyer
miles and bonus points. As long as borrowing is positively correlated
with weaker socioeconomic status, bundling leads to regressive distri-
butional consequences. Bundling is similarly unattractive if weaker
consumers are more likely to extend their low-price short-term loans
into the high-priced long-term.
32 See Ronald J. Mann, Global Credit Card Use and Debt: Policy Issues and Regulatory
Responses 28-29 (U of Tex L and Econ Working Paper No 49, 2004), online at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=509063 (visited Jan 6, 2006) (describing the disadvantages of debit cards, specifically no
float, no benefits, and fewer legal protections); Sujit Chakravorti and Alpa Shah, A Study of the
Interrelated Bilateral Transactions in Credit Card Networks, Emerging Payments Occasional
Paper Series 1,23 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago July 2001) (showing that debit cards do not
offer the benefit programs, extended warranties, and free credit until the end of the billing cycle
that credit cards offer).
33 See Mann, Global Credit Card Use and Debt at 31-32 (cited in note 32). This is not to
say that debit cards are not replacing credit cards at all. They are. See Tom Brown and Lacey
Plache, Paying With Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U Chi L Rev 63, 70 (2006). The success of
the debit card is at least partially explained by its successful bundling with other banking ser-
vices-the cost of which are underestimated by consumers.
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C. Cell Phones
As in the credit card market, common practices in the cell phone
market suggest that providers of wireless communication services are
responding to consumer misperceptionY Consider the steep jump in
per-minute charges when the consumer exceeds the plan limit. A re-
cent study found that most contracts specify an increase of more than
100 percent in the per-minute price, with some contracts specifying
increases of 200 percent and beyond." Clearly, these huge increases do
not reflect a corresponding change in the provider's per-minute cost.
Arguably, the high prices set for minutes beyond the plan limit
respond to consumers' underestimation of their future use of the cel-
lular phone. Providers respond to consumer misperception by bun-
dling airtime (i.e., talking minutes), handsets, and other services such
as voice mail. The high long-term prices subsidize the free phones, free
voicemail, and lower short-term prices.6 A seller who offers handsets
as a stand alone item would have to price these handsets at their mar-
ginal cost. Such a seller would find it difficult to compete with cellular
service providers who "give away" free handsets as part of their
"handset plus service" bundle.
Wireless service contracts are also an important example of mul-
tiperiod subscriptions. As discussed in Part III.A, providers employ
various tactics designed to sustain this intertemporal bundling though
increased switching costs. This bundling argument explains the com-
mon lock-in clause, which ties the consumer to the specific provider
for as long as three years.37 The lock-in clause targets consumers' un-
derestimation of the cost of lock-in. Specifically, consumers may un-
derestimate the many contingencies that would induce them to end
the contract earlier: the appearance of a more attractive offer from
another provider; a change in their need for wireless services; or an
unanticipated financial hardship that renders the monthly cellular
phone bill too painful to bear.
34 See Della Vigna and Malmendier, 119 0 J Econ at 380 (cited in note 9) ("Cellular phone
companies can extract profits from naivet6 by setting high marginal prices for minutes beyond
the monthly allowance."); Bar-Gill, 98 Nw U L Rev at 1429-30 (cited in note 28) ("As in the
credit card market, competition might be pressuring providers of wireless communication ser-
vices to exploit consumers' imperfect perceptions of the future."); Barry Nalebuff and Ian Ayres,
Why Not?: How to Use Everyday Ingenuity to Solve Problems Big and Small 178-79 (Harvard
Bus Sch 2003) (discussing how cell phone carriers exploit consumer misperceptions).
35 See Della Vigna and Malmendier, 119 0 J Econ at 380-81 (cited in note 9).
36 See Nalebuff and Ayres, Why Not? at 179 (cited in note 34) (noting that competition in
the cell phone market focuses on the short-term, free phone dimension).
37 Providers offer different short-term perks to tempt consumers into choosing service
plans with longer term commitments. See Della Vigna and Malmendier, 119 Q J Econ at 380-81
(cited in note 9); Bar-Gill, 98 Nw U L Rev at 1429-30 (cited in note 28).
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As with high prices for minutes beyond the plan limit, it seems
difficult to justify the lock-in clause on cost grounds. In some indus-
tries, fixed costs may justify a lock-in clause. It is unlikely, however,
that per-consumer fixed costs alone can explain the lengthy lock-in
clauses observed in the cell phone industry. Moreover, even if fixed
costs are substantial, lock-in is not the obvious response. Why not sim-
ply charge an upfront fee? Lock-in clauses are common because con-
sumers underestimate the cost of lock-in. In the cell phone market,
lock-in clauses do double duty. First, they sustain the intertemporal
bundle. Second, they support the bundling of cellular service plans
with handsets and other services. The revenues generated by these
lock-in clauses, together with the revenues generated by high prices
for minutes beyond the plan limit, pay for the free phones and other
short-term perks offered by cell phone service providers.
What are the welfare implications of bundling in the cell phone
market? If consumers overestimate the value of cellular communica-
tions (or at least overestimate the value of sticking to a specific pro-
vider), they will buy too many handsets even absent bundling. Bun-
dling only exacerbates this problem.
The cell phone market exemplifies the dynamic interaction be-
tween consumer perceptions and seller/provider reactions. Recent
innovations such as rollover minutes and flexible, no lock-in contracts
suggest that at least some consumers have more accurate perceptions
about the long-term costs of the wireless service. The evolution of con-
sumer perception is driven by independent learning by consumers and
by providers' advertisement campaigns. Understanding consumer per-
ception may help predict market outcomes. Conversely, market out-
comes can serve as indicators of consumer (mis)perception.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The preceding analysis suggests that sellers often respond to con-
sumer misperception by bundling the misperceived product (or com-
ponent) with another, accurately perceived product (or component).
The analysis further suggests that such bundling can be either welfare
reducing or welfare enhancing. When bundling exacerbates the ad-
verse effects of consumer misperception, regulation designed to dis-
courage bundling may be desirable.
38 I focus explicitly on unbundling policies. Other policies may be equally effective. For ex-
ample, regulators can directly target the misperception that gives rise to the bundling response.
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In noncompetitive markets the antitrust prohibition on tying
serves as a direct unbundling policy. One possibility is to extend this
prohibition against bundling to competitive markets. In at least two
contexts such an extension may have already occurred. First, where a
base-good seller operating in a competitive market (for the base
good) attempts to bundle the base good with aftermarket parts or ser-
vice, the Supreme Court has suggested that antitrust tying law may
apply.'° Second, the Magnuson-Moss warranty legislation of 1975 re-
stricts sellers' ability to bundle warranted goods with other goods re-
gardless of the level of competition in the relevant market." Given the
severity of this remedy, however, it should probably be used, if at all,
only in extreme cases where the bundling practice is obviously harm-
ful and where alternative policies are ineffective.
A less blunt unbundling policy is to promote competition on each
component of the bundled product. If a consumer who bought a printer
from seller A could buy ink cartridges from seller B, seller A would
not be able to set low (below marginal cost) printer prices and high
(above marginal cost) ink prices. This example suggests standardiza-
tion as a potential solution to the bundling problem. 2
Focusing on intertemporal bundling, the use of bundling tactics
can be discouraged by reducing switching costs. The legal guarantee of
cell phone number portability is an example of a policy aimed at in-
creasing competition by reducing switching costs." Limiting sellers'
ability to use early termination penalties in subscription contracts is
another example of a competition fostering, unbundling policy.
Disclosure regulation may also serve as an unbundling policy." If
sellers bundle printers and ink in response to consumer misperception
39 See, for example, the antitying provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 15 USC
§§ 1,14 (2000). For a recent analysis of tying in the printhead market, see Independent Ink, Inc v
Illinois Tool Works, Inc, 396 F3d 1342 (Fed Cir 2005) (discussing patent tying through a contract
requiring the buyer to purchase ink cartridges only from the seller of the printhead), cert
granted, 125 S Ct 2937 (2005).
40 See Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services; Inc, 504 US 451,479 (1992) (denying
the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the allegation that the practice of limiting
independent service organizations' access to materials that were necessary to partake in the
machine repair service market constituted an illegal tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman
Act, even though the base good market was competitive). See also generally Carl Shapiro, Af-
termarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 Antitrust L J 483 (1995) (summa-
rizing and criticizing the Kodak rule). However, given the specific circumstances of the Kodak
case and the way the Kodak rule has been interpreted in subsequent decisions, the Supreme
Court's willingness to extend tying law to competitive markets should not be overstated.
41 15 USC § 2302(c) (2000). See Craswell, 62 BU L Rev at 662 (cited in note 7).
42 Of course, standardization is not without cost. In particular, it may hinder innovation.
43 See 47 CFR § 52.23 (2005) (requiring carriers to allow for phone number portability).
44 For an excellent discussion of disclosure regulation as a potential response to bundling,
see Craswell, 62 BU L Rev at 689-94 (cited in note 7).
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about future use, regulation requiring sellers to provide "total cost of
ownership" information may effectively prevent bundling.' If a seller
must advertise an inclusive price that adds the average cost of ink
over the life of the printer to the printer's stand alone price, consum-
ers will be less inclined to buy cheap printers that are bundled with
expensive ink. If a mortgage lender or a credit card issuer is required
to calculate for the consumer and explicitly state the total (or ex-
pected) interest and fee payments over the life of the loan, then con-
sumers will be more likely to balance this total cost information




Bundles are everywhere. Durables are bundled with parts and ser-
vice. Diagnostic services are bundled with treatment services." Products
are bundled with selling services (e.g., showrooms and knowledgeable
salespersons).' Michael Spence, in a seminal contribution, argued that
almost every product "should be thought of as a bundle of characteris-
tics." 9 In the global economy these bundled characteristics should be
broadly defined to include contractual provisions and potentially in-
dependent products.
The motivations for bundling are numerous: from leveraging of
monopoly power, to product differentiation, to simple cost saving. This
Essay explored another motivation for bundling. It presented bundling
as a strategic response to consumer misperception. The welfare and
policy implications of bundling depend on the motivation for the ob-
served bundling. Monopoly leveraging is bad. Cost saving is good. Bun-
dling in response to consumer misperception can be either good or bad.
This Essay provided some tools for the policymaker to identify
misperception-based bundling, and to ascertain when such bundling is
45 The EPA's "Energy Star" program is a leading example. On the benefits of "total cost of
ownership" information see Nalebuff and Ayres, Why Not? at 177 (cited in note 34) (claiming the
EPA's Energy Star program gives consumers total-cost-of-ownership information, which allows
them to "add in the expected energy costs to the initial purchase price" of many products, and
that "[clonsequently, the program is said to save consumers $5 billion annually"). The special
disclosure required under Section 106 of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act when bundling durables and service is another case on point. See 15 USC § 2306 (2000).
Ideally such disclosure regulation can achieve the same results as direct price regulation-a
much more intrusive policy.
46 See Bar-Gill, 98 Nw U L Rev at 1403-04 (cited in note 28), also discussing the limits of
disclosure. Id at 1418.
47 See Beales, Craswell, and Salop,24 J L & Econ at 515 (cited in note 1).
48 On resale price maintenance and the recovery of selling costs see, for example, Lester G.
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J L & Econ 86,104 (1960).
49 Spence,44 Rev Econ Studies at 561 (cited in note 1).
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welfare reducing. It then considered various regulatory responses and
unbundling policies. The difficulty in identifying the motivation (or
motivations) for an observed bundle, coupled with the difficulty in
evaluating the welfare implications of bundling even when its underly-
ing motivation is revealed suggests regulatory caution. For this reason
the most attractive unbundling policies are those that facilitate the
smooth operation of markets-through reduced switching costs and
the provision of information-rather than the more heavy handed
policies that directly prohibit bundling or attempt to fix the price of
the bundle or its components."
50 See Colin Camerer, et al, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U Pa L Rev 1211, 1212 (2003) (proposing "an approach
to evaluating paternalistic regulations and doctrines ... [that] creates large benefits for those
who make errors while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational"); Cass R.
Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U Chi L Rev
1159, 1160. 1162 (2003) (proposing "a form of paternalism, libertarian in spirit, that should be
acceptable to those who are firmly committed to freedom of choice on grounds of either auton-
omy or welfare.... Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak and nonintrusive type of pater-
nalism, because choices are not blocked or fenced off.").
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APPENDIX: ELASTIC DEMAND
This appendix extends the analysis in Part II of the article by in-
troducing elastic demand.
A. Framework of Analysis
Returning to the printers and ink example, let i 0 denote the
amount of ink (for example, the number of ink cartridges) to be used
by the consumer, which also represents the amount of printing that
the consumer will do. Let v(i)> 0 denote the value of printing and
assume decreasing marginal utility from printing: v'(i) >0 and
v (i) < 0. (To guarantee an internal maximum, I also assume that
v (0) = -c and limi v'(i) = 0.) Introducing consumer misperception,
let the perceived value of printing be (i) = 6. v(i), where 5 < 1 repre-
sents underestimation and 5 > 1 represents overestimation. The per-
unit costs of printers and ink are cp and ci, respectively. The per-unit
prices of printers and ink are pp and pi, respectively.
I study a two-period model. At T=0 the consumer decides
whether to purchase a printer. At T=1 the consumer decides how
much to print, and accordingly how much ink to purchase. Mispercep-
tion affects only the T=0 printer purchase decision, not the T=1 ink
purchase decision. At T=1 the consumer learns her true value of print-
ing, v(i). The model is solved backwards, starting from the T=1 ink
purchase decision.
If the consumer bought a printer at T=0, then at T=1 she will buy
an amount of ink i*(pi) that solves max(v(i) - pi" i). The First-Order
Condition (FOC) v'(i* (pi)) = pi implictly defines i* (pi) .
I now examine the consumer's T=0 decision whether to purchase
a printer. First note that due to misperception at T=0, the consumer
thinks that at T=1 she will buy an amount of ink it*(pi) that satisfies
(*i (pi)) = pi or v(i (pi)) = Pi/6. Comparing the FOCs that define
i* (pi) and i*(pi) leads to the following observation.
Observation 1:
(1) If the consumer underestimates the value of printing, i.e., if
( < 1, then at T=0 the consumer underestimates the amount of
ink that she will buy at T=1: t*(pi) < i*(pi).
(2) If the consumer overestimates the value of printing, i.e., if
( > 1, then at T=0 the consumer overestimates the amount of ink
that she will buy at T=1: i*(pi) > i*(pi).
If the consumer buys a printer, she will enjoy a surplus of
wpp,P)= v(i*(pi))- P i i (pi)- p,. Therefore, the consumer should
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buy a printer at T=0 if and only if w(pp, pi) > 0. But rather than the
true surplus, w(p,, pi), the consumer perceives
(p, p,) =i(P ))-pi (p)-pp . Therefore, the consumer will buy
a printer at T=0 if and only if W(pp,pj) > 0.
I begin by deriving the equilibrium behavior and welfare in the
no-bundling case. I then compare this no-bundling benchmark to the
case where bundling is feasible.
B. The No-Bundling Case
Absent bundling, in a competitive market sellers will adopt per-
product marginal cost pricing, namely p, = c and p = cp. At T=1 the con-
sumer will buy an amount of ink i* (ci) th t sati fies v(i* (c.)) = ci. At
T=O, the consumer surplus is wp,pi)= v(i (ci ))-c i ) (ci - C, and
the consumer should buy a printer if and oly if w(cP,c)> 0. But the
consumer perceives a surplus of W(Cp, ci) = f1i (ci ))-c i T (c)- cp, and
will buy a printer at T=O if iV(cpCi) > 0. This leads to the following ob-
servation.
Observation 2:
(1) If the consumer underestimates the value of printing, i.e., if
6 < 1, then v(c,,ci) < w(c,,ci), and the consumer might not buy
a value-increasing printer.
(2) If the consumer overestimates the value of printing, i.e., if
J> 1, then v(c,,c) > w(c,,ci) , and the consumer might buy a
value-reducing printer.
Proof:
Rewriting the perceived welfare as a function of 6,
g(pp,Pi;g)=3.v(i*(pj))-pi "i*(pi)-pp, and applying the Envelope
Theorem, I obtain: (ppp;) = V(*(p)) > 0. Noting that
w(pp, pi;3) = '(pp, pi; 6 = 1), the results stated in Observation 2 follow.
QED
C. The Bundling Case
Bundling eliminates the pp = c and p, = c, constraint, and replaces
it with the more lax zero profit constraint, ,r(pp,P)=0, where
pp,pi)p+pi i*(pi)-[cp +ci .i*(pi)] is the seller's profit. The
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bundling seller chooses a pricing scheme (pp,pi) that solves:
max(Wv(pppi)) s.t. g(pp,pi)=O.5' FOCs reduce to:
pp) (P'Pi)/tPP = Nw(P'Pi)/aPi
ag~r(pp, Pi)/aPp a)r(Pp, Pi)/aPi
The (absolute value of the) fraction on the left hand side of
Equation (1) is the consumer welfare "bang" for each firm profit
"buck" when pp is lowered. The (absolute value of the) fraction on the
right hand side of Equation (1) is the consumer welfare "bang" for
each firm profit "buck" when p. is lowered. These two ratios must be
the same. Otherwise there is an "arbitrage" that can increase con-
sumer welfare without reducing firm profits.
The fraction on the left hand side of Equation (1) simplifies (us-
ing the Envelope Theorem) to: -1p. The consumer
welfare bang for firm profit buck is always -1, because pp is just a zero
sum transfer. The fraction on the right hand side of Equation (1) sim-
plifies (using the Envelope Theorem) to:
al PPilai- ~ i* (Pi)
aff( p, Pi)/pi )+ (pi - CJ)-*( i) / . A $1 increase in 
ink
price reduces perceived consumer welfare by t*(pi), i.e., by the num-
ber of ink cartridges that the consumer expects to buy. The same $1
increase in ink price raises the seller's profit on infra-marginal car-
tridges by * (pi) , but costs the seller a profit of p, - c, on the marginal
cartridges that will no longer be sold given the higher price.
Substituting into Equation (1), I obtain:
(2) (Pi)(2) i(Pi)+(Pi _ Ci). i* (Pi)/pi -
When 6 = 1, * (pi) = i* (pi) and Equation (2) impliesp, = c,. When
5<1, i*(pi)<i*(pi) and Equation (2) implies p,> c (given
di*(pi)/dpi < 0 ). And when 3 > 1, i*(pi) > i*(pi) and Equation (2)
implies p, < ci (given di*(pi)/dpi < 0 ). Intuitively, a larger 6 increases
51 This formulation of the seller's maximization problem follows from an assumption of
Bertrand competition among sellers. First, the seller's profit must equal zero; otherwise a com-
petitor will'offer a slightly lower price (on either dimension, p, or p) and attract all of the con-
sumers. Second, given zero profit, the seller must choose a price combination that maximizes
consumer welfare; otherwise a competitor will offer a welfare-increasing price combination and
attract all of the consumers.
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the number of ink cartridges that the consumer expects to purchase,
and thus increases the consumer welfare bang for every firm profit
buck attained by lowering the price of ink. Therefore, the price of ink
is inversely related to 5.12
The results obtained for ink price, when plugged into the zero
profit constraint, produce the parallel results for the printer price. Re-
arranging the )r(pp,pi) = 0 constraint, I obtain:
pp -cP = -(pi -ci)- i*(pi ). Therefore, when 3 = 1 impliesp, = c,, it also
implies p, = c. When 5 < 1 implies p, > c,, it also implies p, < cp. And,
when 3 > 1 implies p, < c,, it also implies pp > cp.
Proposition 1 summarizes:
Proposition 1:
(1) When consumers underestimate the value of printing, i.e.,
when 3 < I, a bundling seller will set p, > c, and p, > cp.
(2) When consumers overestimate the value of printing, i.e.,
when 3 > 1, a bundling seller will set p, > c, and pp > cp.
The welfare implications of bundling are summarized in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 2:
(1) When consumers underestimate the value of printing, i.e.,
when 3 <1,
(a) If a printer is purchased both with and without bundling,
i.e., if 0 < iV(cp, Ci) < v(pp,pi), then bundling reduces wel-
fare.
(b) If a printer is not purchased both with and without bun-
dling, i.e., if iv(cpci)< W(pp,pi) < O, then bundling has no
effect on welfare.
(c) If a printer is not purchased absent bundling but is pur-
chased with bundling, i.e., if v(cpci)< 0 < Wv(pp,pi), then
bundling increases welfare.
(2) When consumers overestimate the value of printing, i.e.,
when 3 > 1, bundling reduces welfare:
52 The analysis thus far derives from the FOCs of the seller's optimization problem that
were reduced to Equation (1). Interestingly, the same FOCs, and thus the same results, obtain
when competition is replaced by monopoly, and the monopolist solves the problem:
max(p,) st. 1in pp=o Of course, while the ink price will remain unchanged, the
p inter price will necessarily increase.
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(a) If a printer is purchased both with and without bundling,
i.e., if 0 < i (cp,ci) < Wv(pp,pi), then bundling reduces wel-
fare.
(b) If a printer is not purchased both with and without bun-
dling, i.e., if iv(cpcj) < v(pp, 1P) < O, then bundling has no
effect on welfare.
(c) If a printer is not purchased absent bundling but is pur-
chased with bundling, i.e., if iiv(cpcj) 0< iZv(pp, pi), then
bundling reduces welfare.
Proof:
When bundling is feasible, prices are set to maximize fZV(pp,pj).Therefore, V(pp, Pi) > I(Cp, Ci) "
(1) There are three possible scenarios:
Scenario 1:0 < i'(cp,ci) < '(pp,pi). A printer is purchased both
with and without bundling. In this scenario no bundling is better,
because it optimizes the ink purchase decision. Formally, as
shown in the analysis preceding Proposition 1, when 5 = 1 i4(,-),
which then equals w(.,-), is maximized by p, = c and pp = cp. There-
fore, for any set of prices P ci and pp # Cp.
w(pp,pi)<w(cp,ci). If a printer is purchased both with and
without bundling, welfare is greater absent bundling.
Scenario 2: itV(cpcj)< iv'(pp,pj)< 0. A printer is not purchased
both with and without bundling. In this scenario bundling does
not affect welfare.
Scenario 3: v(Cpcj) 0 <i v(pp, pi). A printer is not purchased
without bundling, but a printer is purchased with bundling. In this
scenario bundling increases welfare if w(pp, pi) > 0. I next show
that w(pp,pi) > i'V(pp, pi) (and because in Scenario 3 iv(pppi) > 0
this implies w(pp pi ) > 0 ): Rewriting the perceived welfare as a func-
tion of 59 i 4pp,pi; 8)=.v(i *(pi))-pi "j(p i ppand applying
the Envelope Theorem, I obtain: a (p p,; = v (p1))>0.It
follows that W(pp, pi ; 6) = v(pp,. pi; J = 1) > i (pp, pi; 6 < 1).
(2) There are three possible scenarios:
Scenario 1:0 < iv'(cpci) < iV(pppi) . A printer is purchased both
with and without bundling. In this scenario no bundling is better,
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because it optimizes the ink purchase decision. (See part (1) of
the proof for the formal derivation.)
Scenario 2: iv(cpc i ) < 1V(pp, pi) 0. A printer is not purchased
both with and without bundling. In this scenario bundling does
not affect welfare.
Scenario 3: iV(cpc.) < 0 < v(pp,pj). A printer is not purchased
without bundling, but a printer is purchased with bundling. In this
scenario bundling reduces welfare, because this is an inefficient
purchase: w(pp,pi) < (cp,ci) (and in Scenario 3 ii(cp,ci) <0).
To see that W(pPp ) < v'(CpCi), recall that W(CpCi)< v(CpCi)
(from Observation 2) and w(pp,pi)<w(cp,ci) (proved in part
(1), scenario 1).
QED

